A memorial service is being held later today (22nd August 2015) to mark the 30th Anniversary of the Manchester Air Disaster in which 55 people died, two were crew members and the remaining 53 were passengers on the British Airtours 737 jet.

131 passengers boarded flight 28M for its scheduled flight to Corfu that day. The pilots heard a loud thud as the Boeing 736 traveled along the runway, their first thoughts being a burst tyre. However, an engine failure had sparked a dangerous chain reaction, leading to a punctured fuel tank. Take-off had to be abandoned and the plane brought to a swift halt, but smoke and flames quickly engulfed the rear of the aircraft – causing panic in the cabin.

The Boeing 737 Aircraft where 55 people died – image sourced from bbc.co.uk news reports

Nearly all of the victims died as a result of the effects of smoke inhalation as they tried to reach the front exits – one of which had jammed. The investigation by the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) lead to a raft of safety changes.

The AAIB report at the time states the accident cause;

“The cause of the accident was an uncontained failure of the left engine, initiated by a failure of the No. 9 combustor can which had been the subject of a repair. A section of the combustor can, which was ejected forcibly from the engine, struck and fractured an underwing fuel tank access panel.”

One of the first things the investigation found, was that the position of the aircraft, when it finally came to a halt made things far worse – there was a prevailing wind fanning the flames onto the fuselage of the aircraft.

The main recommendations of the report were:

• In the event of a fire, procedures to be developed to allow/enable the crew to position an aircraft with the fire downwind of the fuselage.
• Fire extinguishing techniques inside passengers cabins to be reviewed to deal with internal fires.
• Aircraft cabin materials to be fire resistant, this is to include seat covers/wall/ceiling panels.
• Onboard water spray/mist fire extinguishing systems to be developed as a priority matter of urgency.
• A review to examine the existing requirements over “unobstructed access” to exits and whether they need updating in light of this accident.
• Distribution of experienced cabin crew throughout the cabin.

Many aspects of aviation fire evacuation procedures have changed as a result of this disaster. An aircraft on fire will now always stop upon the runway itself, rather than taxiing away – meaning that passengers are evacuated far more quickly. Far more visible is the removal of a seat on each side next to the over-wing exits to create extra space and minimise potential bottlenecks. The access panels for fuel tanks have also been reinforced.

An overhead shot showing the scale of destruction. Source: Manchester Evening News

But could such a disaster ever happen again, even with the 30 years of improvements to safety?

Potentially, yes, we can never engineer all the risks out of the system – what we can do however is reduce the likelihood and potential damage from each risk – this reduces the risk and hopefully means that the potential of such an accident happening again is remote.

Sources: AAIB Report 8/1988 Boeing 737-236, G-BGJL, 22 August 1985 Link to Report