‘the Calais jungle’

The Calais “Jungle”

Robert Curtis


Many illegal immigrants into the EU have congregated around Calais in an endeavour to get to the UK (or “England” as everyone conveniently calls it). This has caused great distress to the people of Calais – some 8,000 people living in unsanitary conditions right on their doorstep. It also causes real problems to those trading between France and the UK, and of course to holidaymakers who do not want to run the gauntlet in order to get to their destinations. Many businesses in Calais have closed or re-located, and visitors now use other ports to get to either France or through to the UK.

The French and British agreed a protocol called the Le Touquet Treaty in 2003. This was completely independent of the EU. It allows UK border officials to be located in Calais in order to carry out border checks more conveniently – this arrangement suits both countries as it eases trade and provides a small relief for genuine refugees.


The decision of the UK to leave the EU has no effect on this arrangement – though of course it has been used as a bargaining chip by vociferous French politicians who have recently claimed that if the UK is leaving the EU, then the border will effectively have to move to Dover and the Jungle residents would set up camp here in the UK. This is, of course, both completely spurious and impractical as France would have to “encourage” or “allow” the Jungle residents to come here, and the UK would, as they are illegal immigrants, be perfectly entitled to send them straight back for processing.

France often states that the immigrants are trying to get to the UK so essentially they are the UK’s problem. This is not a true reflection of the legal position but it is a powerful emotive argument to use for French consumption.

The new Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, and her counterpart in France, Bernard Cazeneuve, have ordered a fresh review of security in Calais and confirmed they will continue with the treaty under which British border checks are carried out on French soil, confirming the position that the treaty is not affected by Brexit.

The Law

If we go back to the two main principles which cover this type of situation as set out by the UNHCR and the Dublin Regulation within the EU, the legal position is quite clear. Refugees are defined under the Refugee Convention – and I will leave it to you to decide whether the majority of the residents of the Jungle are in fact fleeing a country where they are in danger of their lives, or merely looking for a better life elsewhere. Either way they are currently illegal immigrants and under the Dublin Regulation, adopted in 2003 by the EU, their asylum application should be examined by the state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU. This may be France (many of the residents are of North African origin so may have entered through southern France) or another country such as Greece or Italy. What is very clear is that they have not entered through the UK, so are not the responsibility of the UK authorities.

Current Situation

The French authorities have been under enormous pressure from the residents of Calais town, and the local council, to find a definitive solution to the problem, and they recognise that to try to offload the residents of the Jungle to the UK is not only against the law but would also encourage thousands of new migrants to come to Calais for the final leg of their intended journey to England. This would exacerbate, not ease, the problem. So the French have decided to bulldoze the camp and transport the residents to other parts of France (though not in that order….). These are the scenes we are seeing today with buses taking the residents away from the jungle.

Moral Obligations

Let us not forget the moral obligations of developed and rich countries in respect of migrants (either genuine refugees or economic migrants) to house at least some of them. This is the basis of the argument currently raging in the UK whereby we have agreed to take a number of unaccompanied children but their ages are suspect and many are considered to be well over 20. Many commentators are also suggesting that the “unaccompanied children” label will only encourage families to send their children on a dangerous journey across Europe in the hope of the UK taking them and then the rest of the family joining later on.

Has bull-dozing resolved the issue?

Not really. EU migration policy is a real mess, as we saw a little while ago. There is no security of the border, and no agreement as to what to do with the people already here and continuing to arrive. The Schengen Agreement is not being followed (with birders going up and checks being made), nor the Dublin Regulation (migrants are being transited through countries, not processed), and talk of quotas runs completely contrary to the idea of free movement. Policy (if it can be said to be that) is in disarray, and is essentially being adopted differently by different countries in mainland Europe to suit their own circumstances and demands of their populations.

I may be very cynical here, but I am asking the question “why has France chosen to act so decisively and so soon after the Brexit vote?”. The country has adopted a very different stance for the last 10 years, yet now chooses to send the residents of the Jungle to other parts of the country. Could it possibly be that they will quietly be given French citizenship away from the glare of publicity, i.e. in small rural areas of France rather than in Calais, which would allow them to come to the UK as EU citizens? The speed of the French reaction gives them about 2 years to bestow citizenship on the Jungle residents which is ample time, and it won’t be done with anyone watching, or in large numbers. It would effectively solve the problem from the French point of view, and the residents would simply “disappear” in the UK when they arrived so there is no chance of them returning to French soil. I hope I’m wrong…..

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The EU Referendum part 2.

Robert Curtis

Part II – The Legal Position after the Vote
I will mainly be talking about the legal position, and not getting too far involved in political, economic or social debates about the effects on a particular sector, or our relationship in general if we decide to leave the EU – or indeed our new relationship if we remain. I do use a couple of current examples to illustrate the hyperbole that’s built up on both sides – but the examples are not trying to influence the debate or the ways people may vote.

1. Vote Remain.

Friday June 24th 2016 – the country wakes to the news that 52% of those eligible to vote have decided that the UK should remain part of the EU. Big sigh of relief from Prime Minister David Cameron and all who backed the Remain campaign. So we all go about our business as usual and nothing changes….

….but then we start to realise that we haven’t voted for the status quo, we’ve voted for “fundamental reform” of the EU, or at least a very different relationship within the EU. Let’s briefly remind ourselves of the 4 key principles which formed the basis of the vote. Yes, I know there are five below, but the last two were originally together, and I think they are fundamentally different.
• Protecting the single market for those outside the Eurozone:
• Writing competitiveness into the DNA of the whole European Union
• Exempting Britain from an ‘ever closer union’
• Tackling abuses of the right to free movement
• Enabling us to control migration
Of course it’s still debatable what all these actually mean, and they are subject to a great deal of interpretation. However, let’s take them at face value and assume they are to become the basis of new treaties in the fullness of time. The Government would, I am sure, prefer to forget the whole thing and simply say “we voted to stay in” but some clever lawyer might actually say “no – had we not had these 4 (or 5) principles in front of us we may have voted otherwise”. We weren’t asked whether we wished to have the same relationship with the EU but one that would be fundamentally different.

So let’s just think through what would happen. Firstly the European Parliament has given itself the authority to validate (or otherwise) the agreement. Just a little diversion here… I know you know there are actually 4 presidencies within the EU, but I can guarantee that only a very few people outside the university know that. Fewer could name them, and fewer still could say what their particular remit is, or where their authority derives from. Law students at Staffordshire University won’t have any problems here, of course, but for anyone else reading this, below are the 4 presidents.

• President of the European Council. Donald Tusk. He has been in charge of the negotiations to date.
• President of the European Commission. Jean-Claude Junker
• Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Currently held by the Netherlands
• President of the European Parliament. Martin Schultz.

You can find out what they do and the composition of the bodies they represent from the link below. You might like to ask yourself how many of them have been elected as “president” and what is the relationship between them, and between each and relevant leaders of each participating country – but that’s for another time.


Back to the main agenda. The European Parliament could ratify the agreement as it stands – in which case the various terms and conditions would (in time) come into effect. There would be no immediate changes but as the treaties were altered the various provisions would be incorporated, and until that time the parties would (hopefully) honour the spirit of the agreement. However, treaty change requires the consent of all 28 members – and one wonders how likely the other 27 are to agree to incorporate all the provisions. Remember that David Cameron has stated that we get the best of both worlds – we gain a competitive advantage over our friends by opting out of the bits we don’t agree with. How likely is it that every single country will agree to us having that advantage set in stone for ever….? It’s also an interesting point to consider what would happen if, say in 5 or 10 years when the treaties come up for renewal, there were a government in the UK other than a Conservative one. It may well be that the competitive advantage written into the agreement would be unpalatable for another political party (and they have argued strongly against many of the negotiating points adopted by the current government) so we could actually veto the agreement ourselves….. Either way, if another country vetoed it, or we did so ourselves, there would be no changes at all to the current relationship and all David Cameron’s “tough negotiation” would be to no avail. Perhaps he actually already knows this, so it didn’t really matter what was written into any agreement – it would never come into force.

This is quite an interesting point from the legal perspective (though I guess by that time not many people would be bothered by the legal niceties) in that the vote to stay in was based on “fundamental change” or at least a fundamentally changed relationship, so if the provisions underpinning that change are not enacted in European law, do we get another vote, this time “in” or “out” based on the status quo rather than on a potential future changed position? Somehow I doubt it, and the government of the day (of whatever perspective) would simply say that this was an “in or out” referendum, once in a lifetime, and you chose “in”. That’s why several commentators have suggested we wait until the agreement has been ratified by the European Parliament (though of course not enacted in Treaty change as that would take too long) before having the vote. And that’s why you can understand David Cameron’s desire to get it out of the way as quickly as possible, because if the European Parliament said “no” then we’d have to go back to the negotiating table.

The scenario of other countries not accepting any treaty change is very real, and not some theoretical construct. The basis of the agreement is flexibility or “special considerations” which would then create expectations in other counties. The Financial Times on February 22nd 2016 puts it very eloquently “By transforming the right for a state to leave the EU into the right to blackmail partners with the threat of leaving, Mr Cameron has opened Pandora’s box.”

2. Vote Leave.

Friday June 24th 2016 – the country wakes to the news that 52% of those eligible to vote have decided that the UK should leave the EU. Does David Cameron resign in shame and embarrassment? Does Boris Johnson mount his challenge to become Prime Minister? Let’s leave these questions to the politicians and concentrate on the legal framework.

Firstly, let us remind ourselves of the commitment made in the Conservative Party manifesto before the election in 2015 “We will honour the result of the referendum, whatever the outcome.” Similarly, in early discussions surrounding the debate when the date was announced, there was talk of the referendum leading to a second vote on different terms. Let us assume that this will not happen – and the government has been very clear that the result is binding for a generation. So essentially we wake up to the UK leaving the EU. This blog discusses how that would happen. Remember that a lot of rhetoric has been given by both sides of the debate – on the one hand that it would take 10 years to get any decisions at all (well, that would be a fast turn-around compared to most EU negotiations….!) and on the other that there would be no problems or difficulties in extricating the UK from the EU – clearly there would, and these problems would have to be addressed practically.

I am sure you have come across reference to “Article 50” and whether or not (or how soon) it would be invoked. The principal provisions of Article 50 are copied below – you can find a link to the full Lisbon Treaty at the end, but this is one time I’d suggest NOT reading the whole thing – the “reader-friendly” version runs to 384 pages.

The language of Article 50 is quite straightforward but as always, the devil is in the detail of how it would work in practice – which is a very interesting discussion as no-one has ever invoked article 50 so it would be setting precedents all over the place, and we’d all be genuinely navigating in unchartered waters.

“1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.”

This is the basic statement – but I would like to alert you to the fact that there is no provision for a state to be excluded from the club. So all the talk of Greece being forced out in 2014 and last year was really so much hot air – only Greece could have decided to leave, no other country or group of countries, nor any of the EU institutions, could have forced them to do so.

“2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be………concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”

“3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”

“4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.”

So (for once) the language is quite straightforward and clear. Once Article 50 is invoked there is a two year negotiating period during which time a date for final withdrawal is agreed. In that two-year period nothing changes and all the same rules apply, but there is a change in the negotiation position between the country leaving and those remaining, as paragraph 4 makes clear that the country leaving will not take part in the discussions of the Council about its leaving. This is pretty obvious but has been erroneously misinterpreted by some to mean that the country leaving would be unable to take part in any negotiations. That is not the case, just that (as would be expected) the country leaving can’t sit on both sides of the table at the same time.

This two-year period is where the detailed negotiation of the type of relationship the country would have with the EU talks place, and covers a range of interesting topics that have been put before the public already in the referendum debate (though one has to say with rather more emotion and divergence from reality than we could have expected). These topics would include our relationship regarding trade, whether we still allow free movement of people from the EU, cross-border security and information sharing, the position of those already resident in each other’s countries, health-care arrangements for those travelling etc…

I know I said I would steer clear of politics and opinion, but I’d just like to burst a couple of bubbles – one on each side of the debate – which are, in my opinion, quite far from reality.

Firstly let’s explode the myth that we wouldn’t be able to trade with the EU after leaving. Put simply, there are many countries that actually trade successfully with the EU without being part of the EU – in fact some 120 of them….. Of course there are difficulties with trading with another trading bloc but actually this happens all the time. The EU is not the only trading bloc in the world, but one of about 8. I am not suggesting that the detailed rules and regulations are not complex and often cause difficulties, but let’s take one small but very important recent example – steel. China is not part of the EU and actually doesn’t have a trading agreement with the EU yet is able to export its steel to EU countries very successfully. To quote from the EU’s own website (links at the end of the text). “The European Union and China are two of the biggest traders in the world. China is now the EU’s 2nd trading partner behind the United States and the EU is China’s biggest trading partner. The EU is committed to open trading relations with China”. So how is it that there are no trade agreements, yet trade occurs, and not only occurs, but is spectacularly large? Well, obviously, you’ve been brainwashed by the “in” campaign into thinking that as soon as we leave then we cease to trade, but that is demonstrably not the case. Many countries in Asia, South America, North America all export cars, electronic goods, clothing, food, fashion items etc… to the EU (and import them from the EU) but without a trade agreement. There would of course be changes, and these would mainly affect those currently trading (hence their reluctance to change) but trade would continue, and with it the creation of jobs in both the trading partners. Likewise, the issue of meeting standards of those imposed by another trading bloc has caused people to think “let’s not rock the boat”. But we already do meet these standards and would have to continue to do so for each and every country (or trading bloc) that we exported to. We import from the US, and we export to the US. The US has different standards to the EU – so we have to meet those standards (as we do). And remember, again, there is no trade deal with the US. As the EU website says “The EU is negotiating an ambitious and balanced trade and investment deal with the US.” (full text in link at the end). So although there would be negotiations (which actually go on all the time between different trading partners) nothing substantial would change in reality.

Secondly let’s turn our fire against the story that is commonly told by the “out” campaign about immigration being the fault of the EU and that we would gain control of the numbers of migrants. Whilst there is truth in the fact that we would be free to set our own limits on immigration, in reality we do have control of the immigration from non-EU countries but choose not to exercise it. In 2015 there were approximately 350,000 migrants coming to this country on a net basis. That is, 600,000 people came in but 250,000 left. Of those 350,000 how many were from the EU? Only 170,000. So a further 180,000 came from other countries where we do indeed have the right to control the numbers. Why would this change much if we left the EU? We wouldn’t suddenly stop many of the current 170,000 EU citizens as the vast majority are key to our economic growth. Many of these people share similar cultural and historical backgrounds and have proven that they are keen to work and to contribute to society. Talk of “benefits tourists” is a tiny sideshow. Even if we were to reduce the 170,000 by (say) 50%, there would still be 180,000 from outside the EU who would enter – based on current trends and willingness of the UK government to act. Mr Cameron stated that he wanted to reduce net migration to “the tens of thousands” per year. He has spectacularly failed, admitting nearly double his maximum target with immigrants from the category the country does indeed control. Why would leaving the EU change any of that…?

These are not arguments for or against staying in the EU, but I just wanted to use them as illustrations of the need to undertake rigorous research into each and every area of discussion, and to form your own opinion based on the facts, not on the rhetoric which is often somewhat divorced from reality.

Anyway, as one correspondent has written, it doesn’t matter which way we vote, as the fact of having a referendum has given us a golden opportunity. The “in” camp say we will be infinitely better off if we stay, the “out” camp say we will be infinitely better off if we leave. So whichever way we vote, it looks like we’ll have a wonderful future….!




Robert Curtis April 2016. robert.curtis@staffs.ac.uk

The EU Referendum

Part I – How We Got To Where We Are


When writing this blog I promised that I would steer clear of politics, but it’s difficult to divorce the politics from the other issues completely as the former are often used by both sides of the debate to reinforce their positions.  Moreover, the reason we are having a referendum at all is rooted in politics far more than in objective reasoning, so let’s start there and trace the developments


There has been a groundswell gathering momentum for the last 10 years over the UK’s relationship with the EU, which came to some sort of pinnacle around the time of the last election in 2015.  During the 5 years prior to that – remember this was a time of coalition government between the Conservatives who are pretty much split over the issue, and the Liberal Democrats who are totally in favour of the UK remaining in the EU, and a time when the UK Independence Party (the clue is in the title….) was gaining a lot of electoral ground.  Essentially a threat to the Conservatives, UKIP was one of the biggest obstacles to the Conservatives gaining an overall majority at the 2015 election.  Partly to neutralise this threat, the Conservatives began talking about offering the country a referendum on the issue.  David Cameron set out his position in a speech delivered at Bloomberg’s headquarters in London on the 23rd January 2013.  This became known as the “Bloomberg speech” and it set out the reforms to the EU which the Prime Minister wished to achieve.  His position was quite clear – that after negotiating “fundamental reform” of the European Union, he would offer the public the opportunity to vote on the new relationship in an in/out referendum.  It’s worth noting the words “fundamental reform” as we’ll return to these on several occasions during this discussion.


The full text can be found using the link below and it’s worth reading as it draws on historical ties to create quite an emotive backdrop.  It was a powerful speech challenging most of the current structures and direction of the EU – and it set the scene for the negotiations to follow.  We will later compare what was achieved in those negotiations to what was said in the speech.  I therefore make no apology for quoting extensively from the speech.




After talking about the historical basis of the EU, the Prime Minister turned to the current position with the words “…European Union and how it must change…”  He recognised that then was perhaps not the best time to be introducing fundamental reforms but felt that the crises then on-going would force the EU to reform itself, thus alleviating pressure on Britain to do so.   He said “why raise fundamental questions about the future of Europe when Europe is already in the midst of a deep crisis?” – quite a powerful formula of words to use about the club of which you are a member.


He identified 3 major challenges confronting the EU, which formed the basis of the changes he wanted to see.  These were, and I quote:

  • First, the problems in the Eurozone are driving fundamental change in Europe.
  • Second, there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead.
  • Third, there is a gap between the EU and its citizens which has grown dramatically in recent years, and which represents a lack of democratic accountability and consent.


“The biggest danger to the European Union”, he said “comes not from those who advocate change, but from those who denounce new thinking as heresy”.  Again, it is interesting to note how far any changes have actually been made in the intervening 3 years.


Repeating the phrase “we need fundamental, far-reaching change” he went on to enunciate 5 principles on which a new model EU would be based.  Again these are direct quotes, and you might like to note the somewhat undiplomatic language.  Remember this is a club of which he is a member, and of which he wishes to remain a member:


  • First: competitiveness – we urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective decision making that is holding us back. That means creating a leaner, less bureaucratic Union.
  • Second: flexibility. We need a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members, and to challenge the concept of “ever closer union”.
  • Third: power must flow back to Member States.
  • Fourth: democratic accountability. We need to have a bigger and more significant role for national parliaments.
  • Fifth: fairness. Whatever new arrangements are enacted for the Eurozone, they must work fairly for those inside it and out.


It was a powerful and emotive speech, using phrases such as “heretical”, “challenging”, “sclerotic”, “holding us back” etc…and essentially distanced himself from the rest of the EU.


The speech concluded with no less vigour:  “The European Union that emerges from the Eurozone crisis is going to be a very different body. It will be transformed perhaps beyond recognition by the measures needed to save the Eurozone.”


Again, you can be the judge of what changes have actually be made within the EU, whether it is indeed “very different” or “transformed……beyond recognition”


Finally he wanted the various changes embodied in Treaty change to “entrench the diverse, competitive, democratically accountable Europe that we seek”.


Conservative party manifesto March 2015
All the above happened in 2013 – two years later we were approaching an election in the UK, and manifestos were being prepared to tell the public what each party proposed to do if it were to govern with an overall majority.  Whether or not you read manifestos, and whether or not you think they are worth the paper they are written on, it is usually worth testing what was said against what has been achieved.  So let’s turn to the manifesto which can be found below:




Page 72 talks about the EU and is entitled “Real change in our relationship with the European Union”.  Note there’s a subtle shift already – no longer is the main thrust that the EU itself must change, but rather that “our relationship” must change, although to be fair it did use similar language to the Bloomberg speech later on.

Confirming that the referendum would be held by the end of 2017 it promised to:


  • “reform the workings of the EU, which is too big, too bossy and too bureaucratic”
  • “reclaim power from Brussels” as well as insisting that:
  • ”the EU needs to change”


The manifesto also introduced two concepts missing from Bloomberg, but which would have popular appeal to many voters.  The first was that the EU was “…too undemocratic” and the second was “large scale immigration”.  Remember the period – early 2015 when the first pictures of massed immigration into Europe were projected onto our TV screens.


We know that the Conservatives won an overall majority in May 2015, and duly set about ensuring that the referendum took place.  Mr Cameron made a further speech on 10th November 2015 (link below) setting out the then current position, building on the Bloomberg speech, and laying the formal foundations for the negotiations which would presage the vote.




He recognised that the challenges facing the European Union had not diminished since the Bloomberg speech, but had grown.  By now, of course, not only had Greece just been rescued from the brink of bankruptcy – but with a financial noose around its neck which will last at least 50 years (and most admit will never be repaid) – but the migration crisis had been ongoing throughout the whole of the summer, with the EU standing by impotently but still talking of needing to “do something”.  France had endured the Charlie Hebdo shootings which killed 12 people earlier that year – little could Mr Cameron know that a mere 5 days after his speech more than ten times that number would be gunned down in the same city in the Stade de France attacks.


He repeated “The European Union needs to change”, used the phrase “fundamental change” and re-stated the 3 challenges facing the EU – let me just remind you of these:

  • the Eurozone
  • lack of competitiveness
  • lack of democratic accountability

All of these were, he said, still valid.  Indeed they were “…as critical now as they were when I first set them out “ – clearly the EU hadn’t changed in the ways that Mr. Cameron expected in 2013 but he added another, guess what….?  Yes, of course:

  • the migration crisis


And it’s worth reading – not for what it says (as it is largely a repetition of the earlier speech) but for its tone.  My interpretation is that the Bloomberg speech was a fiery, impassioned and determined set of statements, designed to spur not the British people, but the institutions of the EU into making the sort of “fundamental changes” which would easily secure the “In” result at the referendum.  This one seems to me to be delivered in a tone of bored, almost subservient, resignation, in the full knowledge that nothing has changed and nothing will change.  Many of the phrases are statements of hope such as “..this should be perfectly possible” and “there is no reason why….” rather than the bold positives of three years earlier.  The language distinctions would be a perfect treasure trove for a specialist – I am no specialist but there’s a big difference between the earlier “will” and the later “would” which is often used.


Cutting to the chase, the four objectives set out as goals for the negotiations were:


  • “protect the single market for Britain and others outside the Eurozone.” This is much watered down from the earlier statements which sought to expand and build upon the single market.  This phraseology again seems defensive and negative.
  • “write competitiveness into the DNA of the whole European Union.” – laudable but practically meaningless formula of words.
  • “exempt Britain from an ‘ever closer union’”. Quite how this would be achieved as a member of the club if others want to go down a different path is not explained.  Interestingly Mr Cameron sneaked in a further objective as an adjunct to this one “to bolster national parliaments.”  Mr Cameron clearly recognises that many people would say “but these are only words” for he qualifies the statements by adding “…not through warm words but through legally binding and irreversible changes.”
  • “tackle abuses of the right to free movement, and enable us to control migration from the European Union, in line with our manifesto.”


From the legal point of view the introduction of the words in this speech “…a basis that is legally-binding and irreversible, and where necessary has force in the Treaties” should cause us to examine reality against rhetoric and see what legal protections have been included, as well as the determination of all parties to enforce them.  Interestingly, discussions in the broadcast media between the various parties following this speech, including those who would be negotiating on behalf of the EU, disagreed quite dramatically on this point.  Whilst Mr. Cameron insisted that all the negotiation points were legally binding, the EU Commission stated that they would need to be put to the European Parliament which could overturn or modify them at a later stage.  This prompted some commentators to raise the point “why not wait till the European Parliament has passed judgement and then have a referendum…?” which has never (in my opinion) been satisfactorily answered, and is something we’ll return to for the next blog.



The negotiation – what was asked for, what was achieved.

I should imagine that asking the average person in the UK (or indeed the rest of the EU) what it is we are voting on would elicit the answer “in or out of the EU” – but we should remember that this was not the original intention.  It’s worth reminding ourselves that the Prime Minister told us that after achieving agreement on “…a fundamentally reformed European Union…” we would then be asked to vote either “out” or “in, but with reforms as negotiated”.  Otherwise, why go through the rigmarole of attempting to negotiate anything?


The final negotiations have not been anywhere near as clear or concise as the original speech setting them out, but as far as we can gather, the four things below are what has been asked for and achieved, and presumably what everyone should be aware of if we are taking part in a vote.  It’s quite interesting to note that we never hear of the negotiations any more, or what changes have been achieved within the “reformed EU” to enable us to make up our minds.


I will leave you to consider whether or not the four objectives have been realised through the negotiations – or indeed how closely they match what was expected from the earlier strong speeches.  The words in italics below are the actual words which we should be aware of, and which form the basis of the “new relationship” with the EU.  I have put in my comment, not from the “political” point of view of a Euro-sceptic or Euro-enthusiast, but purely comparing them to what was originally sought, and what they actually mean:


Protecting the single market for those outside the Eurozone:

Mr. Cameron wanted to make sure that countries outside the Eurozone were not materially disadvantaged, and to protect the City of London – the world’s largest financial trading centre.  The agreement states “Measures, the purpose of which is to further deepen the economic and monetary union, will be voluntary for member states whose currency is not the euro.  Mutual respect between member states participating or not in the operation of the euro area will be ensured…….the single rulebook is to be applied by all credit institutions and other financial institutions in order to ensure the level-playing field within the internal market.”


RWC Comment – some protections have certainly been built in by using the word “voluntary”, but the inclusion of the words “to ensure the level playing field within the internal market” was inserted at France’s insistence to ensure that the City of London was not able to exclude itself from financial regulation imposed by the rest of Europe.  If, for example, Brussels decided to impose a tax on financial transactions, then the “level playing field” clause means we would have to impose such a tax as well.


Writing competitiveness into the DNA of the whole European Union

The agreement says the EU “must increase efforts towards enhancing competitiveness, along the lines set out in the Declaration of the European Council on competitiveness. To this end the relevant EU institutions and the member states will make all efforts to strengthen the internal market”

RWC Comment – this doesn’t sound to me very much like “fundamental reform”.  The EU has become less competitive with other areas in the world – China, Asia, America, South America – and it sounds like they are paying lip service to a different approach to competitiveness.  If the EU has achieved so little in the last 50 years I can’t see that this formula of words “must increase efforts” and “make all efforts” is going to spur them on to reduce regulation and improve labour market reforms.  It reminds me of a serial criminal who says “this time I really will obey the law”


Exempting Britain from an ‘ever closer union’

The agreement says “It is recognised that the United Kingdom, in the light of the specific situation it has under the Treaties, is not committed to further political integration into the European Union. The substance of this will be incorporated into the Treaties at the time of their next revision in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties and the respective constitutional requirements of the Member States, so as to make it clear that the references to ever closer union do not apply to the United Kingdom.”

RWC Comment – a real win, at least in terms of the words used.  When the treaties get revised, sometime in the next 15 years or so, they will state that ever closer union does not apply to the UK.  My question is – what does this mean in practice?  The EU’s stated aim is “ever closer union”, so how can one member not go along with the fundamental principle on which the club is constituted?  It is also interesting to note the words “and the respective constitutional requirements of the Member States”.  Note the plural.  This would strongly indicate that it is the other members who will decide whether or not to re-open the treaties, and whether or not to grant the UK it’s opt-out on ever closer union.  This brings us back to the question posed earlier – how legally binding is any of this?


Tackling abuses of the right to free movement, and enabling us to control migration

The agreement says “The Council would authorise that Member State to limit the access of newly arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefits for a total period of up to four years from the commencement of employment. The limitation should be graduated, from an initial complete exclusion but gradually increasing access to such benefits to take account of the growing connection of the worker with the labour market of the host Member State. The authorisation would have a limited duration and apply to EU workers newly arriving during a period of 7 years.”

RWC Comments – whatever reference there is to “benefits” will have almost zero effect on immigration.  European Union citizens don’t come to this country for benefits, they come to work – and contribute significantly to our economy.  Every EU citizen has the right of free movement to any country within the EU, and any limitations on benefits would only act as a disincentive, not a “control”.  Several commentators have suggested that the lift in the minimum wage would cancel out any such disincentive in any case.  The UK is not part of Schengen (see earlier blog article) so does not have to accept any of the illegal immigrants currently entering, but as soon as they become EU citizens there is no control.  So whatever your views on immigration may be , there is absolutely no “control” built in to this part of the agreement.

If we vote “remain”, is the agreement legally binding?


Interesting question – and as we saw, a lot of disagreement, but we’ll consider that in part II in a little while.


Robert Curtis April 2016.  robert.curtis@staffs.ac.uk